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BOOK REVIEW

Killing Globally, Punishing Locally?:
The Still-Unmapped Ecology of Atrocity
By Mark
A. Drumbl. Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. vii, 316.
$29.99 (paperback).
ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERSt
All we can do is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive
species, just as we do at the diversity of plant or animal species.

Jean-Frangois Lyotard1
INTRODUCTION: LOCATING THE PROJECT

It can be difficult to write something interesting about
something one agrees with. So it is with Mark Drumbl's
Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (APIL).2 I
generally find Drumbl's intuitions and recommendations
commonsensical, in accord with things I have thought
myself or noted with approval in others' work. But that
makes for dull reading; one way to generate some critical
t Associate Professor, Indiana
tiwaters@indiana.edu.
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2. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
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traction, if not friction, is to consider where his idea might,
even must, go further-to ask, in a sense, what else the
author might have said.
Drumb's core intuition-that the international criminal
law (ICL) paradigm fails, and by its nature will fail, to
address much of the complexity of great evil, while also
driving out local variation responsive to the interests and
needs of affected communities-is surely right, and his
conclusion-that it is time to move beyond the protectively
encomiastic Pollyannism of the early ICL project and begin
to ask searching questions about costs, benefits, failings,
and improvement 3-is surely right as well. So the intuitions
and the conclusions are right; the framework in betweenand the implications beyond-are places of complexity,
contestation, and, inevitably, speculation. While agreeing,
then, one feels that there are challenges, obstacles, and
opportunities that inevitably present themselves.
Drumbl is not plowing virgin soil, and he's not plowing4
alone. His contemporaries-people like Immi Tallgren,
Robert Sloane, 5 and Laurel Fletcher 6 -are writing on
substantively similar lines; while established scholars
instrumental in developing or expounding the project of
ICL--such as Diane Orentlicher 7 and Mark Osiel 8-have
long expressed critical concerns about ICL's narrowness
and rigidity, and, like Drumbl, have contemplated a
broader range of responses. The entire field of transitional

3. See infra Part I.
4. Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law,
13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 561 (2002).

5. Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of InternationalPunishment:
The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International
Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2007).
6. Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and
International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1013 (2005); Laurel E.
Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contributionof Justice to Reconciliation,24 HuM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002).
7. Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Settling Accounts' Revisited: Reconciling Global
Norms with Local Agency, 1 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 10 (2007) (reviewing a
discussion of transitional justice from the late 1980s).
8. Mark J. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22
HUMAN RTS. Q. 118 (2000) (rehearsing a number of dissatisfactions with ICL);
Mark J. Osiel, Modes of Participationin Mass Atrocity, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
793 (2005).
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justice-populating the academy and practice 9-is in effect
an outgrowth of these kinds of concerns. Indeed, in this
sophisticated environment, it is increasingly rare to find a
dogmatic defense of the pure ICL project that makes no
accommodation of the broader transitional justice paradigm.
And was there ever really a time when these concernspragmatic concerns, philosophical concerns-did not shadow
the project of international justice? After all, the
intellectual contours of a speciated taxonomy of guilt,
including the collective element so critical to Drumbl's view,
were being laid out just after the war-even as the
Nuremberg trials were underway-by Karl Jaspers.' 0
But sharing the land with others doesn't mean there is
nothing to do-this is, after all, one of the few book-length
treatments, rather than a journal article," on this particular
question. 12 The commonsensical propositions that Drumbl
advances may be shared, but they are not universally
accepted and only imperfectly acted upon. Jaspers's work,
for all its importance, didn't provide the model for ICL,
which has mostly honored his ideas by quoting and ignoring
them on the way to its apotheosis of the individual as the
sole subject of the international criminal process. And

9. See, e.g., THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Grieff ed., 2006); see
also TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, WHAT IS
TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE?,
http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/
(2006)
(noting that
transitional justice activities include: "[d]omestic, hybrid, and international
prosecutions . . .truth-telling initiatives, including national and international
commissions . . . reparations

. . . including compensatory, restitutionary,

rehabilitative, and symbolic reparations... Institutional reform . . .[including]
vetting of abusive, corrupt, or incompetent officials . . . . Promoting
reconciliation within divided communities . . . Constructing memorials and

museums ...Taking into account gendered patterns of abuse").
10. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (1947). Drumbl cites
Jaspers twice and a letter to him from Hannah Arendt. DRUMBL, supra note 2,
at 36, 156, 225 nn.79-80, 269 n.29.
11. Two of Drumbl's earlier articles form part of APIL. DRUMBL, supra note
2, at xi. One passage is drawn from a third work-Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing
International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1317 (2005) (reviewing
FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

JUSTICE (Philippe Sands ed., 2003)). DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 36, 225 n.75.
12. Certainly some of Mark Osiel's books-such as MASS ATROCITY,
ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN ARGENTINA'S
DIRTY WAR (2001)-have asked similar questions, but Drumbl's focus on
punishment is unusual.

1334

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

certainly, despite the broader recognition of the fairly
obvious proposition that complex problems require complex
answers, a defense of the narrow ICL model is still made
from some corners, in full voice: outrage at procedurally
deviant trials; insistence that no amnesty for international
crimes is possible; the ritual invocation that through the
criminal trial process we avoid the stigma of collective
punishment and advance the campaign to end impunityall with a stultifying effect on the intellectual and practical
development of post-conflict responses beyond the canonical,
reflexive resort to the criminal process.
So there is certainly still an argument to be made, and if
necessary made again. And this Drumbl undertakes; his
intended contribution-which, taken as a whole, is
essentially to press an existing debate further-can be
divided into three objectives.
The first is definitional: to demonstrate that the defining
difference between international and domestic crime is the
collective nature of mass atrocity; the second is quasilegislative: to advocate adoption of multiple processes for
responding to atrocity, and with them, the legitimation of
defined forms of collective punishment; and the third is
evidentiary or methodological: to ground these objectives in
an empirical penological proof. 13
The thing which has interested many people, I think, is
in the second of these: Drumbl's call for acknowledging
acceptable forms of collective punishment. This interest is
as much dismay as enthusiasm, I suspect, since the
abjuring of collective punishment is still a reflexive
rhetorical posture for many, and his particular interest in
monetary penalties draws comparison to sanctions whose
profligate and imprecise cruelty has been much criticized.
But the first and third contributions are worth careful and
critical examination as well.
And there is a minor note in APIL, though one which
might productively be brought to the fore, because it
complements the argument: the idea of an ecology of
13. This is not how Drumbl characterizes his own contribution; instead he
sees these three things: "to present data regarding how and why local, national
and international institutions punish [atrocities]"; "to explore whether extant
methods of sentencing actually attain the affirmed objectives of punishment";
and "to move the dialogue from diagnosis to remedy." DRUMBL, supra note 2, at
xi.
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atrocity and punishment. 14 The rationales for diverse
responses to atrocity lie in claims about local, particular
instantiations of highly general universal norms in ways
that are sensitive to context, culture, history, politics, and5
values. The language of environmentalism and biodiversity
or of human and cultural geography16 might ground and
describe the rationales of complexity, diversity, and underlying
commonality that Drumbl locates in cosmopolitan
pluralism: genetically related, but speciated, specialized,
inter-related but suited to the niches in which they dwell,
"both the diversity and the similarities have the same
underlying causes.' 7 And so although the tropes and
frameworks of these disciplines are not the structure
Drumbl has chosen, he has-as with his principal themesindicated a direction in which things might evolve: an
ecological perspective with the still-unfinished project of
mapping that implies.
I.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK IN BRIEF

It is worth having an outline of APIL's argument, both
to see its basic sensibility and to bring into focus those
areas where its framework implies some further challenge,

14. Id. at 37 ("[Tlhe orthodoxy of the predicate of avoiding collective
responsibility could be rethought and broader 'ecological' approaches to the
violence acknowledged." (citing Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 6, at 573, 580,
601)). Later, Drumbl describes a "legal geology" of transplanted norms and
refers to "the social geographies of the afflicted societies." DRUMBL, supra note 2,
at 125-27, 148. The reverse-considering environmental damage as atrocityhas been attempted. See Kathryn Norlock, The Atrocity Paradigm Applied to
Environmental Evils, 9 ETHICS & ENV'T 85 (2004); see also ELLI LOUKA,
BIOD1VERSITY & HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR THE PROTECTION
OF BIODIVERSITY (2002).
15. Cf. BIODIVERSITY (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988); DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA
OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE (1996).
16. Cf. RICHARD PEET, MODERN GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT (1998); W. Wesley
Pue, What is Law? Preliminary Thoughts on GeojurisprudentialPerspectives, in
GEOGRAPHY, ENVIRONMENT, AND AMERICAN LAW 30 (Gary L. Thompson et al.
eds., 1997).
17. Mark A. Dimmitt, Biomes and Communities of the Sonoran Desert
Region, in A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SONORAN DESERT 3 (Steven J. Philips &
Patricia Wentworth Comus eds., 2000); see also W. R. Tobler, A Computer Movie
Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit Region, 46 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234, 236
(1970) ("[E]verything is related to everything else, but near things are more
related than distant things.").
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as well as to consider the direction one could, and perhaps
should, go.18
1. Mass atrocities (which Drumbl calls extraordinary
international crimes) have qualities that distinguish them
from ordinary crime: a unique egregiousness; 19 a strongly
collective component where ordinary crime is individual;
and a basis, not in deviance, but in conformity. This difference
in the nature of the underlying crime recommends different
models of response-of process and punishment-and even
different purposes for the entire enterprise.
2. However, the dominant response to atrocities has
been a project constructed on a close analogy to the
domestic criminal process and drawing on the "liberal
legalist" 20 assumptions which underpin that process: focus
on the individual, abjuring of collective punishment,
reliance on procedure, and a theory of punishment
grounded on the deviant nature of the criminal. Appearing
in variants from The Hague to East Timor, Rwanda to
Sierra Leone, and in national courts, this standard ICL
model is highly homogeneous.
3. The standard model also makes certain claims about
its purposes; however, an analysis of punishment-one of
the least examined elements of the ICL process-makes
clear the failure of the current model to reach those goals.
International and domestic courts' sentencing practice is
inconsistent and incoherent, and their rationales for
punishment are problematic: sentencing is too selective,
spotty, and inconsistent to serve retributive goals; the
prospect of trials is too remote and infrequent to deter
effectively; and expressivist goals, though more defensible,
are not adequately served either.
4. Worse, even as it fails to achieve its own aims, ICL-with its formal decisional mechanisms-delegitimates and
18. Drumbl provides one too: The first chapter of APIL condenses the
argument of the entire book, and it is reprised in stages throughout and again
at the end. This Review's summary does not hew precisely to the order of
Drumbl's chapters, though it represents his argument.
19. "[Ilnternational lawmakers believe that extreme evil is cognizable by
substantive criminal law. Because extreme evil is so egregious, however, only
special substantive categories of criminality (in some cases newly defined,
named, or created) could capture it. These categories include genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes." DRUMBL, supranote 2, at 4.
20. Id. at 5 (also describing this as "Western legalist").
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displaces other means of responding to atrocity, such as
restoration, lustration, and amnesty, as well as traditional
or context-specific mechanisms such as reintegrative
rituals. These other projects are only allowed space so long
as they are subordinate to the formal ICL project; and
because many of these culturally particular methods are
procedurally
heterogeneous,
they
are
viewed
as
antithetical-contradictory rather than complementary-to
the ICL project. The effect is "legal mimicry" 21 that imports
international legal process-and with it that process's
Western commitments-into the domestic systems '22
of
countries affected by atrocity; in turn, these "transplants
migrate downward, with municipal courts colonizing or
driving out local, non-conforming traditions.
5. This homogenization of legal space-and its evident
failure, on purely pragmatic grounds, to achieve effective
and just outcomes-moves Drumbl to consider ways to
construct a broader, more inclusive mechanism. His
approach is grounded in philosophical perspectives about
the fundamental unity of human response to extreme evil
and the wide variation in that response's possible
expression: "[t]he notion of diverse procedure for universal
wrongdoing . . . fits within a cosmopolitan theory of law,
although it certainly tends toward the pluralist end of the
continuum. 23[His] model, therefore, is one of 'cosmopolitan
pluralism.',
6. Concretely, Drumbl proposes reform along two fronts:
vertical and horizontal. First, he proposes creating space
for
24 to
"bottom-up approaches to procedure and sanction"
counteract the downward-cascading pressures of the
dominant liberal-legalist paradigm. Of course, concerned
about quality control, he proposes a model of "qualified
deference" 25 to determine when heterodox models meet
what he defines as a cosmopolitan pluralist minimum.
What he imagines is a model that is simultaneously more
robust and more flexible than the International Criminal
Court's (ICC) complementarity-itself a process that is, he
21. See id. ch. 5.
22. Id. at 125.
23. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 188.
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suggests, actually far more intrusive and controlling of
state practice than is commonly supposed.
Second, in the horizontal space he proposes progressively
integrating non-criminal models-such as civil penalties
and service requirements-and then a range of transitional
justice mechanisms-truth
commissions,
reparations,
commemorative projects, and institutional reform. The
purpose of this widening is "to advance from law to justice:
initially, by moving international criminal law to a
capacious law of atrocity and, ultimately, to an enterprise
that constructively incorporates extra-judicial initiatives. '26
It is here that Drumbl directly addresses something he has
been indicating all along-that these wider responses are a
form of collective punishment.
7. It should be noted that the center, if not the heart, of
APIL is quantitative. In explicating all of this, Drumbl
draws on a range of international and national courtsfitting to his eventual theme of diversity-and grounds his
case on a study of their punishment practice. The
quantitative and argumentative weight fall mostly on
Rwanda-where Drumbl has worked-which clearly
captures his imagination and provides in its gacaca system,
a pool of data and the central exhibit in the case for a
broader alternative approach.
The rest of this Review considers elements of this
framework in more detail, first in light of the three
contributions the book attempts, and then with regard to
the implications of taking it seriously and taking it further.

II. DEVIANT INDIVIDUAL AND CONFORMING COLLECTIVE:
BEHAVIORAL VARIATION IN STRUCTURED HABITATS

A. The Nature of Atrocity
For Drumbl, it is not the domestic origin of the criminal
process model, but its liberal assumptions, that make it
unfit for service at the international level. Domestic crime
is typically an individual, deviant activity, and domestic
courts are designed to try and punish deviant individualstheir processes are a response to the nature of human
26. Id. at 19.
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activity in the domestic context. But international crimes
are more often characterized by conformity and collective
action. These crimes are not simply massively aggregated
individual acts; they are essentially public, both in their
performance and their participation. Unlike domestic crime,
atrocity often has a performative aspect, conducted in open
view with state sanction; the idea of ritual-and ritual
slaughter-attaches to atrocity. Participation is often a
matter of social adherence and identity: in extreme cases,
such as Rwanda, a literal majority of the population may be
actively involved, but even in less popular atrocities, where
the actual killing is done by a small group, the Jasperian
layers of involvement permeate most of the population who
also participate by approving, supporting, benefiting from,
or even ignoring the killing all around them. Why are all
these lovely houses suddenly empty? No matter-let's move
in!
As Drumbl notes:
This broad participation [in atrocity], despite its catalytic role, is
overlooked by criminal law, thereby perpetuating a myth and a
deception. The myth is that a handful of people are responsible for
endemic levels of violence. The deception, which inures to the
benefit of powerful states and organizations, involves hiding the
myriad political, economic, historical, 27and colonial factors that
create conditions precedent for violence.

In situations of mass violence, the assumptions of the
domestic model are reversed: most people are implicated in
the atrocity, and non-participation-at least, open oppositionis the deviant act. 28
The book is at its best here, early on, discussing the
unique qualities of the collective and consequently, the
different nature of human behavior in that habitat-not
saying something entirely new, 29 but saying it clearly and
27. Id. at 172.
28. Drumbl recognizes the complexity-crime in the domestic context can
exhibit collective features (he points to conspiracy, felony murder, corporate
crimes, and racketeering, among others), while buried within mass atrocities
are diverse individual agendas, from the settling of scores to material
opportunism. Id. at 37-38. His point-a fair one, I think-is that the general
features of the two, though existing on a spectrum, fall in identifiably different
zones and consequently exhibit different features.
29. Cf. Tallgren, supra note 4, at 575 ("Contrary to most national
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gesturing towards the implications. Psychological studies of
leading Nazis after the war showed no proclivity towards
instability or deviance-these were stable, socially conforming
individuals. Placed in new contexts (in Argentina, say, or
Spain) international criminals show no signs of recidivism,
and are often model citizens-a fascinating (if evidentiarily
problematic 30 ) insight into how international crime really is
different.
This difference has implications for the way one would
want to respond to-and punish-such acts. Specifically, it
raises questions about the appropriateness of the criminal
law model. What Drumbl describes as the Western, liberallegalist model-the commitment to individual trial,
procedure, and punishment-is, however imperfectly
realized, an organically sited response to the image of crime
as an individual act of deviance. This means that particular
elements of the criminal process are inapposite to the
different motivations and dynamics of mass atrocity:
atrocity contains undeniable conformist and collective
elements, but ICL is organized according to strongly
individualistic principles.
Frankly, this is more asserted than demonstratedDrumbl does not catalogue the elements of the domestic
trial that fail in translation-but this seems to be a
plausible claim, and certainly a common one. In any event,
there is one element that he does focus on: among these
inapposite elements is punishment by incarceration as
practiced in domestic courts.
Incarceration serves specific penological goals such as
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. These goals are
ill-served at the international level where the mass nature
criminality which is understood to constitute social deviation, acts addressed as
international crimes can, in some circumstances, be constituted in terms of
conforming to a norm.").
30. Problematic, that is, because recidivism requires opportunity as well as
intention, and opportunity is generally lacking following the decisive defeat of
the regimes that committed the atrocity. People like Eichmann, hiding out in
Argentina, have little practical opportunity to foment genocide or operate its
logistics, while they have special incentives to be well-behaved so as not to get
noticed. But the point is trenchant nonetheless, and a powerful empirical
antidote to the popular assumption, reinforced in movies from They Saved
Hitler's Brain (Paragon Films 1963) to Marathon Man (Paramount Pictures
1976) to The Boys from Brazil (Twentieth Century Fox 1978), that these
characters would re-offend given the chance.
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of both victimhood and participation-and the layered
nature of responsibility-make it difficult to imagine a
criminal process ever apportioning blame to all parties.
Even in the largest applications of the criminal processRwanda, or the trials of perhaps 100,000 collaborators in
France-only a fraction of those involved ever come before a
court.
One problem concerns the bystander exemption-the
fact that the people who materially support a regime of
mass atrocity through indirect means are morally
responsible, but are not criminally culpable. This clearly
troubles Drumbl, who views it as one of the more powerful
arguments why a broader set of mechanisms is necessary.
Still, it is interesting to consider why the bystander
exemption is not an instance of the more sophisticated and
layered model Drumbl wants: formal criminal culpability
for some, other kinds of responsibility for others? Drumbl's
response is that the criminal trial process does not merely
fail to reach bystanders, but actually gives them a kind of
amnesty: the criminal culpability of the few creates a kind
of proof of non-complicity
for the many-not guilty, and
31
therefore innocent.
There may be no entirely satisfactory way to have a
criminal process without the very thing it does-convicting
the guilty-creating a kind of halo around the merely
responsible. Only an alternative outside the criminal law
could avoid this risk, but even if such responses existed,
they might prove very difficult to institutionalize, at least in
any pre hoc way that the international community as a
whole can recognize precisely because they would need to be
case-specific and society-specific. It is Drumbl's attempt to
empower just such a set of responses that motivates his
project.
In any event, there is a certain irony in this entirely
persuasive account of the mismatch between domestic
commitments to individualism and the collective nature of
international crime-not only because ICL constantly
31. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1076, 1079 ("[C]riminal trials are ill-suited
to acknowledging the range and complexity of bystander relationships to the
violence ....
liberal law adjudication implies a false moral innocence among
bystanders . . . . Trials provide no direct acknowledgment that bystanderssilent and complicit-also are beneficiaries of the violence carried out in their
name.").
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intones the importance of avoiding collective punishment,
but because one of ICL's effects has been to introduce the
individual into international law as an undeniable subjecta process that, among other things, has given impetus to
claims about the need for individuals to participate more
fully in the formation of law, a matter to which we will
return.
B. Atrocity and War
In explicating the differences between international and
domestic crimes, Drumbl cautions against "falling into the
trap that equates campaigns of genocide and crimes against
humanity with war. '32 And to a point, this is sensible
advice: war, as he points out, can be legal, while genocide
and crimes against humanity never are; the ICC only
identifies mass atrocity crimes as manifestly illegal. But in
perceiving a trap, one may give it an overly wide berth, and
I think this is what Drumbl has done in drawing such a
stark distinction. These crimes are different, yet war is
most often the environment that generates the collective,
conformist behavior Drumbl identifies as an accelerant for
mass atrocity. Drumbl's view is understandably shaped by
his focus on Rwanda, but even in that case there was a
context of military conflict which in part motivated Hutu
radicalization towards genocide (which in turn may have
served, for Tutsi rebels, as an instrument of war policy 33).
Or, how are we to understand Srebrenica, which was an act
of genocide, but also an incident of military operations and
an integral element of Serb war goals?
Here the focus on the nature of the crime, but not the
context in which it is normally committed, seems out of step
with the general thrust of the project. It is more useful to
view the relationship between different kinds of international
crimes as existing on a continuum-whose relationships are
statistical and probabilistic rather than statically defined.
32. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 34.
33. See, e.g., Alan J. Kuperman, Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of
the Rwandan PatrioticFront, 6 J. GENOCIDE RESEARCH 61 (2004) (discussing
efforts by the Rwandan Patriotic Front to provoke genocide as part of a military
strategy). There has been renewed controversy about which side shot down the
aircraft carrying Rwanda's and Burundi's presidents-the event which
precipitated the genocide.
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Moreover, this is a view fully compatible with Drumbl's own
analysis of the collective and individual qualities of
international and ordinary crime, and the consequences he
draws: the diversity he argues for is mostly one of fora and
authorities-allowing different models and actors into the
process in different places, not necessarily the creation of
formal, lawyerly distinctions within any one institution.
C. StructuralFeaturesof the InternationalEnvironment
Drumbl's argument is grounded on the uniquely
collective nature of the crime, but might the inappositeness
of domestic-analogy criminal processes also be tied to
questions of structure-to the unique features of the
international environment? Drumbl is of course aware of
this possibility, but doesn't think much of it: the difficulties
that arise from the peculiarly collective nature of violence
he says, "transcend the standard, and at times tired,
arguments according to which it is difficult to analogize
from the domestic order to the international because the
latter lacks a constabulary, legislature, and enforcement
agencies. '34 And though the world still lacks a police force
and a parliament, presumably the dramatic expansion of
international judicial institutions has, for Drumbl, made
this concern moot.
Still, attention to structure-that is, to the social and
institutional arrangements surrounding and shaping the
criminal process-rather than simply to the object of that
process might clarify what exactly the contours of the
mismatch are. The failure of ICL to realize the classic goals
of punishment may track better with structural explanations
included than with the collective-individual dichotomy
Drumbl develops alone.
The salient feature of international structure is not the
lack of a constabulary, but the absence of the vertical
relationships that shape municipal life. These include
enforcement mechanisms, of course, but also (and this is
often missed) political mechanisms that sit atop and
control, define, or legitimate those mechanisms-an
electoral system, for example, or the executive pardon
power-and interacts with juridical structures. This
34. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 24.
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flatness leaves us with an international process that is, on
the one hand, a pure function of realpolitik, and on the
other, obsessed with the trappings of legalism. Domestic
systems are neither.
And perhaps it is precisely the structural features of the
international system-its flatness, horizontality, conditions
of decisional anarchy, and even, in the formation of norms,
its organic, conversational nature-that motivate the move
to diversity. After all, how many domestic jurisdictions
demonstrate the kind of heterogeneity Drumbl desires, or
would wish to? The presence of "a constabulary, legislature,
and enforcement agencies" 35-and the social agreement
that, far more than the formal monopoly of violence,
underpins their functioning-displaces and homogenizes
36
alternative reconciliation and dispute resolution mechanisms.
An easy dismissal of structure underestimates the role
it can play in complementing Drumbl's own argument:
certainly, an appreciation of the structural differences
between international and municipal systems of social
control is in no way incompatible with an appreciation of
the different crime bases those systems confront. Drumbl
may be tired of the debate, but that may be because it is
perennial-an evergreen, really, that does not fade because
it has not been answered. Finally, even if it does not
motivate Drumbl's project, attention to structure may help
indicate some of the necessary paths of development that
the project of APIL implies, such as the need for a
justificatory and jurisgenerative system of support to the
individuals and communities who logically must craft the
local solutions Drumbl has in mind; I shall return to this in
the final section.
III. MULTIPLICITY
APIL's second contribution is to propose a radical
expansion of the legitimated means by which we respond to
35. Id. at 24.

36. At the same time, the domestic model has considerably greater diversity
in one important respect: the resort to civil processes and a varied economy of
reparation, which is of great interest to Drumbl. It may be that Drumbl is not
merely tired of the argument, but determined to avoid it, because the domestic
analogy proves useful in this respect, even if it is not in parsing the nature of
criminal violence.
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mass atrocity. Today, the field is largely preempted by
international criminal law, although truth commissions, for
one, play a significant role. Moreover, as Drumbl shows, the
pressure for states to adopt models that are compatible with
and derived from ICL is pervasive. The challenge, therefore,
is to find a means of identifying and supporting alternative
means that, while normatively acceptable, are locally
adapted and responsive to the unique qualities of mass
atrocities, namely their collective aspect and their cultural
specificity.
A. Vertical Expansion
Rather than develop his own catalogue of acceptable
responses, Drumbl proposes a decisional mechanismqualified deference: "a rebuttable presumption in favor of
local or national institutions that, unlike complementarity,
does not search for procedural compatibility between their
process and liberal criminal law and, unlike primacy,
does
37
procedure."
criminal
liberal
impose
explicitly
not
This is primarily a mechanism for dialogue and
conversation, not an a priori indication of acceptable
outcomes: "[i]t falls to those individuals, including members
of afflicted communities, who enforce the universal goal of
condemning the great evils at the national and local levels
to fine-tune the interplay and overlap that emerges from
dialogue between the local and the universal. '' 38 At the
same time-and perhaps in response to the almost
immediate objection that might arise about any such
conversation between local and universal claims-Drumbl
identifies six "interpretative guidelines [that] contour the
implementation of qualified deference":
(1) good faith;
(2) the democratic legitimacy of the procedural rules...;
(3) the specific characteristics of the [preceding] violence and of
the current political context;
(4) the avoidance of gratuitous or iterated punishment;
(5) the effect of the procedure on the universal substan[tive
norms]; and

37. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 188.
38. Id. at 189.
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39
(6) the preclusion of infliction of great evils on others.

We need to examine this mechanism critically,
especially its likely application in real cases. There are
actually relatively few concrete examples of alternative
criminal systems in APIL-the Pashtunwali customary law
system, the Iraq High Tribunal, and the Sudanese court
system-and none receives more than a cursory examination.
The Pashtunwali, Afghan customary law, is discussed and
dismissed in two paragraphs-likewise, the Iraqi High
Tribunal. The Sudanese government's domestic trials are
scrutinized for three paragraphs before being rejected. We
have very little information, or even speculation, on the
alternatives a process of qualified deference might discover.
The little we do know suggests a problem of application.
The two reasons Drumbl gives for rejecting the Pashtunwali,
cursory as they are, are instructive. One is mistreatment of
women, since customary law allows the transfer of women
between families in repayment of harm. 40 The second
objection is more interesting still: the Pashtunwali, Drumbl
says, fails qualified deference because "[i]t lacks democratic
legitimacy. The Pashtunwali emerges from the diktat of
patriarchal elites who serve as nonrepresentative religious
4
or military leaders. It is not a consensual project." '
Another way of characterizing the provenance of the
Pashtunwali is that it emerges from a locally legitimated,
highly traditional society of precisely the kind that Drumbl
is hoping to empower. Still Drumbl's disapproval is
matched only by his distaste, and this may be a problem; it
is a very small step from objecting to a practice because it is
not democratically derived to objecting because one does not
approve on substantive grounds.
As for gacaca: if one did not already have a guess about
Drumbl's view, what would one conclude about its
compatibility under the qualified deference test? It passes,
of course, but even on the facts that Drumbl provides, 42 one
39. Id. (emphasis omitted).
40. There are curious, if limited, parallels to the collective punishment
models Drumbl advances later-as well as to his preference for economic
reparations.
41. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 192.

42. His reference is, principally, to the neo-traditional form of gacaca
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could well imagine the opposite outcome. This suggests a
problematic indeterminacy in the concept of qualified
deference: what is it proposing exactly-a legal test, an
atmospheric change, a game of language?
This indeterminacy has practical consequences. There
is deep tension between diversity of outcomes in a pluralist
system and respect for universal principles (here, universal
condemnation of great evil). The unavoidable reality is that
local communities, acting according to their own lights, will
often reach conclusions well outside the comfort zone of
cosmopolitan pluralists like Drumbl.
Discussing the problematic role of plea bargains in East
Timor, Drumbl notes that "[t]he East Timorese situation...
demonstrates the value of an accountability paradigm that
is implemented through different kinds of procedures keyed
to the sociolegal particularities of the afflicted society,
instead of a simple transplant."43 So how exactly are we to
determine the "sociolegal particularities of the afflicted
society"? Drumbl's answer is a careful process of determining
legitimate local interests or interpretations of universals.
But what is to be the means of determining the right mix of
institutions and instrumentalities for a given place? The
immediate aftermath of a devastating civil conflict-or an
ongoing conflict-is hardly the time to send in the
anthropologists to get a dispassionate view of local
reconciliation patterns. After conflict is precisely the wrong
time to construct a careful review-at least, we have enough
experience of post-crisis to expect that unreflective, reactive
management may be an endemic and unavoidable feature of
transition.
And what this suggests is a deeper political question
buried within qualified deference: which individuals and
which collectives matter-not only as victim and perpetrator,
but as decision-makers in negotiating the outlines of a
cosmopolitan pluralist model of punishment? Who, exactly,
modified to include incarceration provisions for genocide and implemented in an
organic law in 2004. This form, he notes, was itself influenced by cascading
pressures from the international courts and, more broadly, by liberal-legalist
sensibilities, often under direct pressure from outside donor and diplomatic
groups. Id. at 72. As such, this instance of a model that meets the qualified
deference standard also serves as an example of how this standard is readily
susceptible to cooptation.
43. Id. at 167.
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is it that defers? The answer would seem to be: us. We-the
international community, the West, the North, the
intervention force-defer to them, the South, the torn
countries, those in need of intervention, or those unable to
forestall it. And while deference of that sort sounds good, it
also sounds like an opportunity to control the definition and
the process:
we are the ones who get to qualify our own
44
deference.
Drumbl must know this is a risk. He has just finished
showing, in what I think is one of the more powerfully
compact treatments in the book, how the ICC's
complementarity principle-much touted as a great defense
against judicial overreach-can and will have the effect of
homogenizing national legal systems on an international
liberal-legal model that represents law substantively and
procedurally very much as the ICC does. 45 If complementarity
can do that, what might qualified deference do? We cannot
be sure, or even speculate with much confidence, because
Drumbl's analytical energies have been deployed elsewhere,
earlier, on the project of a penological proof. When he
arrives at the moment of application, the record is
incomplete, and we are left, mostly, with an exhortation to
further research and to begin the conversation.
The limited number of examples Drumbl discusses do
44. Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1164 (2007) ("The excruciatingly difficult case-by-case questions concerning how
much to defer and how much to impose are probably impossible to answer
definitively .... The crucial antecedent point, however, is that although people
may never reach agreement on norms, they may at least acquiesce in
procedural mechanisms, institutions, or practices that take hybridity seriously,
rather than... dissolving it through universalist imperatives.").
45. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 143. The displacing and homogenizing power
of the international level is considerable but not absolute; local actors can
successfully contest that relationship. For example, Drumbl points out the
pressures on Rwanda to bring its substantive and procedural law into
conformity with international standards and preferences, but the record in the
contest is mixed. See, e.g., Luc Reydams, Book Review, AM. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming Oct. 2007) (manuscript at 6, on file with author) ("The [Rwandan]
government's blaming and shaming of the tribunal and through it, the
international community, coupled with its repeated threats of noncooperation-which in effect would halt the trials in Arusha-and the lack of
response thereto by the UN Security Council have made it prevail in most
confrontations .

.

.

. At the same time the Rwandan government has not

hesitated to use the tribunal to legitimate its hold on power. International
judicial recognition of genocide provides a powerful political weapon that can be
deployed any time against critics.").
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provide some valuable points of navigation for the
boundaries of the project-things like these will lie beyond
the acceptable zone-but on the other hand, this might
suggest that qualified deference, practically applied, may
not prove more open to diverse approaches than the present
model. If this is the conclusion in a paper exercise, then in
the rough-and-tumble of actual decisionmaking, advocates
of ICL may find objections to almost every heterodox
practice. Drumbl's qualified deference, in application, may
simply lead to the replication of a homogenized, nonpluralist set of commitments. In any event, no one would
want to plan a route on such a sketchy map, which suggests
more surveying is needed.
Drumbl knows this, I imagine-his implicit purpose is to
make the case that the way is worth exploring. Still, for
those of us who were already convinced of the problem, the
issue of next steps-and identifying their location-is
already compelling enough.
B. Horizontal Expansion
Alongside this recalibration of the criminal law on the
vertical axis, Drumbl proposes expanding outward,
especially at the state and local level, to embrace judicial
processes that international criminal law has largely
ignored-non-incarcerative penalties such as civil fines and
public service. Indeed, one evident source of Drumbl's
dissatisfaction with punishment rationales is that courts
cling to a "formula of discretion exercised within a strict
reliance on traditional modes of punishment reserved for
ordinary common criminals .... The exercise of discretion
affects the severity but not the form of punishment,46 which
...effectively has become limited to incarceration."
A second phase would expand to extra-judicial institutions
that are the province of transitional justice-and indeed,
Drumbl sees the purpose of these moves as "push[ing] the
enterprise of atrocity law toward the holistic promotion of
justice for atrocity."47 This seems a commonsensical
aspiration-an impression reinforced, especially with
regard to the second move, by the fact that many of these
46. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 50.
47. Id. at 194.
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non-judicial processes are already employed in various
countries.
As before, however, Drumbl provides very few concrete
examples of alternative systems. Certainly, gacaca receives
considerable attention-its neo-traditional form occupies an
interim position between criminal law and procedurally
heterodox dispute resolution mechanisms-and individual
truth commissions are occasionally mentioned but beyond
that, the Ugandan traditions of mato oput 48 and nyouo tong
gweno 49 are among the few examples briefly mentioned.
This relative paucity of examples does not necessarily
vitiate the attraction of Drumbl's proposals, but it does
introduce a level of abstraction about their practical
application. Several questions arise. For example, is this
sequencing necessary? In actual post-conflict societies,
there is no clear pattern of preferring to expand judicial
remedies before turning to extra-judicial remedies; many
communities have chosen a non-judicial means like a truth
commission before, or in lieu of, turning to any formal
judicial process. 50 Moreover, extra-judicial remedies can
conflict with the criminal law project: both Bosnia and
Sierra Leone 51 have seen brush-ups between a court and a
truth commission (or rather, in Bosnia, a proposal for one),
for example. This would counsel for some means of
mediating the predictable disputes and turf wars along the
horizontal.
48. A traditional Ugandan practice of "drinking bitter root herb." Id. at 144.
49. A traditional Ugandan welcoming ceremony "incorporating eggs and
twigs." Id.
50. Drumbl acknowledges that just because a process is not judicial does not
necessarily make it better:
Restorative modalities are no panacea; local justice must not be
sentimentalized. Restorative modalities that draw parallels from
mechanisms used to reintegrate ordinary deviant transgressors in
settled times will likely run afoul of the complexities or reintegration in
situations of mass atrocity. Restorative shaming theory predicated on a
majority of the community's disapproval of the impugned conduct may
not be directly transposable to contexts where a majority of that
community may not have actually disapproved of atrocity.
Id. at 148.
51. But see William A. Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 15 CRIM. L.F. 3 (2004) (arguing that the two institutions succeeded in
cooperating, although acknowledging that there was tension).
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One mechanism seems ready at hand: why is qualified
deference not applied to the broader range of horizontal
processes-to the traditional Ugandan practices, for
example? I see no principled or practical reason why
Drumbl has limited this device-for all the issues I see with
it-to mediating between vertical instances of the criminal
law process.
C. Collective Punishment
But these are relatively minor issues; given Drumbl's
expressly speculative, exhortative project, we can hardly
expect everything to have been tested in advance. 52 Besides,
what is most interesting here is the turn to collective
punishment.
"Turn" is not quite adequate to describe Drumbl's
project, which is in effect a headlong assault on one of ICL's
points of pride and principal justifications: the claim that by
advocating individualized criminal process, it is ridding the
world of dangerous notions of collective guilt. The
personalization of guilt is supposed to move societies
subjected to atrocity beyond collective, ethnic formulations
of conflict and make reconciliation possible. 53 As with any
point of pride, the belief that this is both true and right is
largely unquestioned by mainstream ICL practitioners and
scholars; 54 the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) trumpets this accomplishment
52. Cf. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 204 ("[Tlhis is a discussion of what might
be, not what obviously is. Experiments have not been concluded. Data have not
been generated.").
53. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 297 (2000) ("The basic argument here-a
common one-is that, in Albright's words, 'responsibility for these crimes does
not rest with the Serbs or Croats or Muslims as peoples; it rests with the people
who ordered and committed the crimes. The wounds opened by this war will
heal much faster if collective guilt for atrocities is expunged and individual
responsibility is assigned."' (citing Madeleine K. Albright, Bosnia in Light of the
Holocaust: War Crimes Trials (Apr. 12, 1994))).
54. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 136-39 (2003)
(discussing elements of individual liability and limits on corporate or collective
liability). Cassese also identifies a trend towards enforcement of individual
liability by "attempting to prosecute and punish individuals rather than by
invoking the responsibility of the State . . . [and an] increasing tendency to
target individuals (sometimes in addition to States), and in certain cases even
to use tools of international criminal justice." Id. at 447.
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prominently on its website, despite an almost total lack of
evidence of this effect in the former Yugoslavia. 55 Some
have noted the problematic-even unfounded-nature of
this claim, 56 but Drumbl's argument goes well beyond
critique to an affirmative embrace of the very thing ICL
abhors.
I do not think many other writers-though they may
express the logic-have stated quite so directly that, yes,
the collective nature of atrocity requires a collective
response which the ICL process is institutionally unfit and
indisposed to provide, and indeed, that the principal reason
we should be looking to broader, non-judicial remedies is
precisely because they address the collective aspects of
atrocities by invoking collective responses.5 7
Drumbl is particularly intrigued with-I am tempted to
say fond of-monetary damages and reparations as a form
of collective punishment. He has heard of Versailles, of
course, but he is not dissuaded by this "bte noire"5 8 :
"international criminal lawyers' fears of collective
responsibility have inhibited dispassionate conversations
about its potential in thwarting atrocity and retrospectively
promoting justice." 59 Addressing problems of over- and
55. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY at a
Glance, http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
("By trying individuals on the basis of their personal responsibility, be it direct
or indirect, the ICTY personalizes guilt. It accordingly shields entire
communities from being labeled as collectively responsible for others'
suffering.").
56. See, e.g., BASS, supra note 53, at 297-301 (discussing critically the claim
that ICL individualizes guilt, and noting, at 301, that "the idea that war crimes
tribunals will individualize guilt turns out to be fraught with ambiguity").
57. Drumbl has indicated this preference for collective responsibility
elsewhere in a critique of the "traditionalist" and individualist focus of ICL.
Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1310 ("One response might be for the law of atrocity
to consider redressing collective violence through collective modalities of
accountability. That said, international criminal law's reification of individual
responsibility reflects a fear of collective responsibility, collective blame, and,
especially, collective guilt.").
58. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 201.
59. Id. at 202. Other scholars have considered financial penalties, though
generally in the context of individual civil suits. See, e.g., STEVEN R. RATNER &
JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 240-48 (2001) (discussing
civil suits as a judicial alternative). The International Criminal Court can

award monetary reparations. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
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under-inclusion, he comes down in favor of what he calls
the "crude way"60 on utilitarian grounds: if the potential
costs of being a bystander--or of occupying that empty
flat-are high, then the knowledge of potential collective
responses "could inject a risk allocation and management
analysis into the minds of the general population in the
very inchoate stages of atrocity."'61 Proof that one was not
involved in any way could trigger an exemption.
I am not sure I find the utilitarian rationale persuasiveit makes a big assumption about the rationality of actors,
despite Drumbl's having already persuasively demonstrated
just how different the standard assumptions about rationality,
deviance, and conformity are under differing conditions,
and presumably therefore, how different the calculations
individuals make in those differing environments are too.
(He himself backtracks somewhat, noting how speculative it
all is.62) But as Drumbl notes, collective, non-criminal
punishment comports with other rationales, including a logic
of retribution: if, following Jaspers, we acknowledge the
layered and collective nature of guilt, then material
extractions may make sense and be fair. Simply denying
that atrocity has a collective element-and that this logically
should have consequences for our models of responsehardly seems satisfactory.
Drumbl is not insensitive to the complexities of collective
punishment. Indeed, it is precisely because he is sensitive
to them-because he is not wearing the doctrinal blinders of
the ICL project, whose theology and self-justification are
premised precisely on not being collective-that he is able
to recognize and say that ICL should abandon its
doctrinaire and defective resistance: collective punishment
art. 75, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002; see also International Criminal Court,
Victims and Witnesses: Reparation, http://www.icc-cpi.int/victimsissues/
victimsreparation.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
60. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 197, 201. As opposed to "the careful way,"
which strictly limits its reach to those who have offended according to a theory
of individual agency and therefore "abides by Western legalist assumptions of
causation and individual agency ....

In cases of civil responsibility . . . the

careful way still conditions group membership on some sort of demonstrable
linkage between action (or nonfeasance) and the great evil." Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 203.
62. Id. at 204; see also id. at 171-72 (discussing "two painful realities that
jeopardize the assumption of perpetrator rationality amid cataclysmic events.
These are: first, gratification; and, second, survival").
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can be appropriate, can actually be more just. As he notes,
"[t]he inevitability of assessing the place of collective
responsibility within the project of international justice ...
should be a cause for contemplation and optimism, not
embarrassment or annoyance." 6 To me, this is the signal
contribution of the book.
IV. THE PENOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

APIL speaks about punishment a great deal. Drumbl
makes a strategic decision to organize APIL-as its title
suggests-around a critique of ICL's penological practice.
His aim is methodological: to turn our focus to questions of
punishment and sentencing-which, he considers, have
been under-examined 64 ---as a productive, even indispensable
site for critical analysis of the role of ICL.
It is unquestionably true that courts and scholars alike
have paid relatively little attention to sentencing and
punishment, preferring instead to discuss issues of
culpability and process. Still, there has been considerable
work on the problems with ICL and the attractions of
alternatives; so, the value of an expressly penological
approach must somehow be that it brings a new perspective
to work on transitional justice. And this is where I think
APIL confronts an evidentiary and organizational challenge:
can looking at punishment tell us what is wrong or how to
fix it?
Drumbl makes strong claims based on data about
international and national courts' sentencing practice that
he analyzes in two chapters which form the center of

63. Id. at 201.
64. Two aims are implied in his description of the lack of penological
studies:
Surprisingly little work has been undertaken that explores how and
why criminal justice institutions punish atrocity crimes and whether
the sentences levied by these institutions actually attain the proffered
rationales. Furthermore, there is little empirical work that assesses
whether what international tribunals doctrinally say they are doing
actually has a consistent and predictable effect on the quantum of
sentence.
Id. at xi. These aims track two of the contributions Drumbl identifies for the
book, as noted above.

2008]

THE UNMAPPED ECOLOGY OFATROCITY

1355

APIL. 65 This should be a promising avenue to pursue since,
as he notes, "the positive law documents essentially are
silent as to the penological purpose of the sentences
imposed, [and therefore] much of this structure has
emerged from the jurisprudence of the sentencing
institutions. ' 66 He concludes that "[t]he preference for
incarceration following what liberal international lawyers
deem to be an acceptable criminal trial on the whole falls
objectives, in particular retribution
short of its penological
''67
and deterrence.
Looking for patterns in the sentencing practices of the
international courts, Drumbl finds very few: the quantum of
punishment bears little relation to the crime's seriousness,
with courts trying international crimes often awarding
lower sentences than ordinary crimes might receive;
deployment of aggravating and mitigating factors is
"unpredictable and obscured by significant discretion. ''68
Sentencing, Drumbl finds, is "poorly conceptualized,"' 69 an
"afterthought, instead of a vivid situs of analysis." 70 A lack
of coherence and consistency across institutions weakens
claims about the retributive, deterrent, and expressivist
effects of ICL; his concern is that "erratic sentencing
practice could also affect the coherence and legitimacy of
the punishing institutions, which, in turn, may undermine
"71 This is important for
confidence in their rationality ...
his argument, as these shortcomings open argumentative
and pragmatic space for different policies and approaches.
What concerns me is not the conclusion, but the base of
evidence and the uses to which it is put. What Drumbl
conclusively demonstrates is that courts trying atrocities
exhibit no clear pattern in sentencing, nor any clear theory
of why they sentence as they do. But what does this mean?
What does this tell us about the effects on atrocity? The
answers are more speculative than Drumbl supposes-even
65. Id. at 46-122.
66. Id. at 60.
67. Id. at 180.
68. Id. at 121.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 46.
71. Id. at 66 (making reference to H.L.A. Hart).
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though, as I say, he may have it right.
Part of the problem is a matter of data: there may
simply not be enough data, or sufficiently comparable data
of the right quality to draw the robust conclusions Drumbl
reaches. Where international tribunals are concerned, there
are an extremely limited number of cases; the N of all
international trials is very small, and variation will
inevitably be more pronounced. 72 Moreover, these are
hardly white lab mice; many of these cases may not be the
least bit comparable-at least, we have no reason to assume
they are given the structural heterogeneity of the
jurisprudence: different courts in different places adjudicating
different crimes from different conflicts at different times,
and sometimes applying different law. 73 Internal, institutional
dynamics could explain much of the variation, but these
seem discounted in Drumbl's
analysis in favor of a general
74
chaos.
untheorized
of
claim
In addition, there is a poverty of information in the
presentation of data: many of the notes for Chapters 3 and
4, in which Drumbl analyzes data on sentencing, do not tell
us enough to make meaningful judgments as readers. In
72. For example, the ICTY has publicly indicted 161 people; of the 111 cases
concluded, 25 indicted individuals had all indictments withdrawn and eleven
died prior to completion of trial (four during proceedings, seven prior to
transfer). Two of the 53 individuals sentenced have died while serving their
sentences-a nearly four percent death rate (so far), fairly high when one
recalls that the ICTY only issued its first sentence about eleven years ago. (The
two who died-Milan Babi6 and Miroslav Deronji6-had served just under two
and just over three years, respectively. Until Babi6 died in March 2006, the
death rate for those sentenced was zero.) International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY at a Glance, http://www.un.org/icty/glancee/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). Trials in international courts constitute
only a fraction of all atrocity trials; after the Second World War, for example,
"the vast majority of proceedings occurred at the national level . . . or by
instrumentalities of the occupying powers ... and other states." DRUMBL, supra
note 2, at 48-49.
73. Even the closely related ICTY and ICTR exhibit differences in their
statutes, and interpretative divergence has grown out of those initial
differences. Such variation is even more likely when one expands the
comparison to include the postwar international tribunals-which themselves
had radically different structures, processes, and membership-and national
trials, and those for conflicts as diverse as Sierra Leone and East Timor.
74. An alternative-perhaps less pleasant, but certainly available from
Drumbl's evidence-would be that atrocity trials as a whole are so infrequent
relative to the crime base that no sentencing practice-whether consistent,
flexible, or otherwise-would satisfy the penological objectives of ICL.
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general, we have only the sentence quantum and a squib
line about the reasoning of the court (a reduction for
following orders, for example) to compare to another case in
which the sentence was derived in a different way. For
example, discussing several post-WWII cases, Drumbl notes
that "[t]here does not seem to be any predictable, or at
times even explicable, basis upon which mercy reviews or
confirmations of sentence were conducted" 75 and cites
several cases from British courts with widely varying
outcomes; however, all we learn is the sentences-"[b]oth
accused were found guilty and sentenced to death by being
shot"; "confirming officer commuting death sentence to life
officer not confirming guilt";
imprisonment"; "confirming
"all sentences confirmed" 76 -but nothing about why the
confirming officers might have decided as they did. This is
typical-and curable, because a richer case report could be
produced-but without some indication of the underlying
facts, how are we to know that this variation in punishment
(discussion of which, Drumbl tells us repeatedly, is usually
absent or cursory 77) is not indicative of some substantive
difference in the cases?
The problem, it seems, is that although Drumbl is right
about one thing-that judges do not discuss the rationales
for particular punishments systematically-he may not be
right in what he concludes from this-that there is no
rationale to be discovered. Given judges' textual neglect of
punishment, we must look to the full, rich record of the
trials themselves. Discussions of mitigation and aggravation
(which Drumbl rightly shows are generally ill-developed or
entirely lacking) are, even when well done, ancillary to the
question of guilt for the act. It is only by looking at this
question-and assuring ourselves that two defendants
committed substantively similar crimes (in both quantity
and quality)-that apparent inconsistencies in application
of mitigating and aggravating factors can be meaningfully
examined. Drumbl is focused on judges' discussion of
punishment, and perhaps because of this, he rarely
75. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 113.
76. Id. at 255 n.241 (noting several WWII cases in British military courts in
which sentences were variously reduced or confirmed).
77. Id. at 48 ("The case reports are silent with regard to factors to
differentiate the punishment inflicted on the various individuals convicted in
the [I. G. Fargen and Krupp] industrialists' trials.").
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considers their discussion of guilt-but without this, how
can we evaluate his thesis? I consider this a problem of
evidence or presentation. It may be that Drumbl is right
about the failures of punishment, and of ICL more broadly,
and as I have suggested, I largely agree; but I do not think
that the evidence about punishment, at least as we have it
here, effectively proves this.
Yet even if problems of the size of the data set and the
like could be resolved, and even if we could say with
confidence that the penological practices of courts are as
inconsistent as his data suggest, this does not necessarily
mean international trials are failing in the way he
describes. Drumbl sees inconsistency across tribunals (and,
within them) as a proof of ineffectiveness and incoherence.
But this selfsame variation could, alternatively, be analyzed
as an example of the very thing Drumbl is looking for: a
diversity of voices responsive to local, particular
circumstances-and more diverse and responsive than they
would be if they demonstrated a predictable, lock-step
sentencing pattern for each crime. 78 In the Drumblian
model of qualified deference, international criminal law and
courts still play a prominent role; what exactly should their
jurisprudence look like? How homogeneous ought their
outcomes be?
Finally, there is the question of Drumbl's strategic
choice to focus on penology. Much of the argument about
the purposes of ICL and its shortcomings could be made
with reference to the processes of trial and conviction;
indeed, Drumbl himself builds much of his case on
observations, not about punishment, but about the trial
process.
For example, his discussion of why domestic court
models are inapposite to cases of mass atrocity points to
liberal-legal commitments about individual culpability and
procedure; punishment principles are, at best, a minor key
in his discussion. Similarly, his critique of how ICL has
imported domestic evidentiary standards has nothing to do
with punishment principles (or with data about
punishment); instead, the problems with using domestic
78. Judges in international tribunals defend their sentencing discretion as
responsive to the different means by which crime can be committed, varying
levels of culpability, and the unique qualities of each case. DRUMBL, supra note
2, at 59-60, 235-36 nn.78-80.
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evidentiary and punishment standards spring from the
same underlying mismatch between the nature of ordinary
crime and atrocity (as well as, I would add, the structure of
the two levels). Likewise, his account of the cascading
process of legal mimicry-in which state courts adopt the
model of international criminal process-is explained in
terms of decisions about investigation and procedure, not
punishment. 79 Punishment is one element of ICL--and
Drumbl is right that it is an understudied one-but it is not
clear that it is the essential lens through which to perceive
how ICL fails in cases of mass atrocity.
It may be that the data we have is not amenable to
analysis that would answer these questions. The kind of
crime that "shatters any and all legal systems"80 by its
radical evil may not be responsive to a particular quantum
of punishment; the effort to quantify may prove
unproductive, and the effort to draw conclusions about the
effectiveness of punishment metrics for a crime that is
immeasurable seems quixotic.
This raises the question about what, exactly, the
contribution of these chapters-which together constitute
something like two-fifths of the text-is to the book as an
integral project. There is a contribution-even if not one in
proportion to the erudition and effort they evidently
required, nor to their central place in APIL. It is not clear to
me that answering the question "does what international
tribunals doctrinally say they are doing actually have a
consistent and predictable effect on the quantum of
sentence?" tells us anything particularly useful about the
fitness of ICL for responding to mass atrocity or what
alternatives might be more fit. Suppose tribunals' doctrinal
claims indeed proved irrelevant as guides to predicting
sentencing, surely the relevant question would still be
"what effect do actual sentences have on response to
atrocity?" The question Drumbl poses is an interesting,
even important one, but it, and the work undertaken to
answer it, have the feeling of being grafted onto another
79. Drumbl's enthusiastic endorsement of expressivism as a defensible and
attainable goal of punishment is constructed almost entirely on examples drawn
from the trial process, not sentencing. Id. at 173-79.
80. Id. at 156 (quoting a letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (Aug.
17, 1946), in HANNAH ARENDT, KARL JASPERS CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 54
(Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert & Rita Kimber trans., 1992) (1985)).
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project.
V.

BEYOND INTUITIONS: IMPLICATIONS

At the end of the first, summary chapter of APIL,
Drumbl deploys a strategically left-handed defense of ICL's
role: "[t]here is some room for adversarial criminal trials
within the justice matrix. The value of trials, though, best
flourishes when trials constitute a means to justice, not the
means to justice. 81 In an understated way, this promises a
bold departure: a curiously undercutting admission that,
after the revolution, what is now the archetype might still
be afforded "some room." But when one admits a plurality,
one also admits competition, instability, and contestation.
And although these can be good things, they can create a
marketplace of models that must be managed. The
intuition, then-the idea that ICL must become an "a"
instead of "the"-must be completed by a robust framework
for decision, prioritization, and reconciliation. Without such
a framework, Drumbl's revolution will create a merely
rhetorical space that will change how we talk, but not what
we do-something like the faddish insistence by an allpowerful international community that torn societies must
take "ownership"8 2 of their own crises.
Drumbl's whole project exhibits what he calls at the
outset "a reconstructive ambition ... [to] inspire short-term

reforms to existing institutions and a longer-term
reconstitution of the field. '8 3 And consistent with that, the
concluding chapter really is a kind of recommendation list,
almost in the style of human rights reports; it eschews
analysis for exhortation. They sound like the right
exhortations and the right directions to take, but for one
already convinced of their rightness, the case for moving
81. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 21.
82. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Bosnia and Herzegovina at
Threshold of Promising Future, Must Now Take Responsibility for Reform,
Development, Security Council Told, at 8, U.N. Doc. SC/8693 (Apr. 18, 2006),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8693.doc.htm
("While
allowing
Bosnians to take ownership, the High Representative should continue
advancing reform and complete civilian implementation of the Dayton
Accords."); International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Countries Affected By
Cluster Munitions Take Ownership of Discussionson New Treaty - Belgrade, 3-4
October [2007], Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.icbl.org/news/belgrade-conference.
83. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at xii.
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more boldly and systematically beyond intuition and
inspiration to implications-for giving more weight here at
the end-is compelling.
Again, I think the core intuition is right: the fetishization
of ICL has displaced much else that might be more useful in
stabilizing post-conflict situations and achieving what
affected populations might define as justice. The problem,
as so often, is not with the intuition but with the progress:
Drumbl does not outline the mechanisms or principles by
which we would inter-relate the various niches of this
multiple, varied topography. What, concretely, would we do
to settle on other mechanisms in a given case? It is not
satisfactory to leave this in the realm of the untheorized:
the pull of existing institutions is too strong, so how is this
going to be done?
This is just a book review, not a book, and so I will do
little better. But here are some sketches of the kinds of
problems that taking APIL's argument seriously raises, and
that its project, at least, will need to answer.
A. Pluralism or Deviation?
Drumbl outlines a model of cosmopolitan pluralism-a
commitment to universal values expressed in a multiplicity
of forms.8 4 The two elements of this model are in a
necessary tension: the decision to afford deference to local
solutions will, in many instances, strike outsiders as
deviation from universal (and of course entirely reasonable)
norms. This deviation may have entirely plausible,
persuasive explanations, such as its rootedness in local
context, but it remains, in appearance, a deviation. And for
many-for those who are more cosmopolitan than
pluralist-this will prove too great a strain, too much to
accept.
As I noted, one of the few concrete alternatives Drumbl
mentions (and, presumably, approves) is mato oput which
involves, according to its name, the consumption of bitter
herbs. Now this actually sounds perfectly plausible to me:
reintegrative shaming can be a highly effective means of
bringing closure to conflict. But I can well imagine the
concern, skepticism, and ultimately, in Drumbl's terms, the
84. Id. at 181-87.
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qualification-all in the name of protecting some entirely
reasonable minimum of international human rights
protection, of course-that might greet such a practice,
seriously presented as an alternative to
especially if it were
85
the ICL process.
That there is an element of paternalism, post-colonial
disdain, or bare cultural preference in such a judgment may
be regrettable, but it is also predictable (and indeed Drumbl
identifies the Western commitments-biases--of the ICL
project). The human rights and ICL community-and to a
much lesser extent, the transitional justice communityhas a near-obsession with impunity, particularly with
ending it. The risk, I think, is that Drumbl's instinctively
liberal pluralism will prove more theoretical than practical,
and may falter in the face of concern (his own and others)
that taking it too seriously would jeopardize rights and give
impunity a reprieve. Immediately a heterogeneous claim is
made and the political moment of decision comes, what
crosses the threshold of the universal and meets with our
approval will prove quite narrow indeed. We can expect, in
other words, that the qualifications will be considerable,
and the deference less so, unless we develop a robust
framework in which to cabin discretionary assessment of
exactly which practices pass muster, and why-a grounding
in something other than our abstracted, objectified
preferences.
B. A Minimum List or a PragmaticConversation?
One way of proceeding might be to inquire what a truly
85. See Drumbl on this point:
Many bottom-up transitional justice movements invoke sanctions such
as apologies, shaming, sharing the truth, lustration, and reparations;
and often are willing to procure these by offering amnesties to
perpetrators. This is the case even though such modalities are often at
odds with, and largely squeezed out by, the operation of the [ICL]
paradigm. [ICLI responds poorly to the preferences of local populations
when such preferences conflict with its normative worldview. This
leaves local populations with little recourse but to articulate these
preferences outside of and at times in resistance to top-down
internationalist pressures ....

[Tihese initiatives are at most given a

role of adjunct or additional complement to the fixture of liberal
procedural legalism.
Id. at 63.
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minimum universal normative commitment would require.
86
Candidates might include: commitments to truth;
8
7
procedural protections; an end to impunity; or perhaps a
kind of conditional commitment to uphold liberal-legalist
88
standards if a trial is held.
But a minimum list is problematic in at least two ways.
First, it is extremely difficult to produce an effective list: a
true minimum is unlikely to satisfy committed liberallegalists, while a more expansive list will so constrain local
choice as to defeat the exercise. For some, amnesties are
anathema and may contradict obligations in human rights
treaties; but for others, amnesty may be a way out of
endemic violence. A pragmatic view would ask whether we
care more about a project of reconciliation or adherence to a
treaty, but then that is the nature of a minimal list: it
have reached the limits of pragmatism and
signals that 8we
9
compromise.

86. See Orentlicher, supra note 7, at 12 ("[E]ven in the 'early days' human
rights and other professional experts saw disclosure of the truth about past
abuses as a non-negotiable moral obligation of governments.").
87. Cf. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of
Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 1 1, 10,
32, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 3, 2004),
available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/acess.nsf/get?open&DS=S/2004/616&Lang
=E&Area=UNOC (stating that amnesties cannot be granted in respect to
international crimes).
88. I am reminded of Justice Jackson's much-quoted comment from
Nuremberg about the high importance of procedure, and the less quoted part
immediately preceding it to the effect that it would be all right to summarily
execute the Nazi leadership, but if one does have a trial, then it must be done
correctly. Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, 31 A.B.A. J. 290,
293 (1945); see also BASS, supra note 53, at 6 (citing a letter from Robert
Jackson to Henry Morgenthau Jr.: "It's a political decision as to whether you
should execute these people without trial, release them without trial, or try
them and decide at the end of the trial what to do ....

That decision was made

by the President, and I was asked to run the legal end of the prosecution. So I'm
not really in a position to say whether it's the wisest thing to do or not.").
89. Cf. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 22, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://daccessods.un.org/acess.nsf/get?open&DS=S/2000/915&Lang=E&Area=UNOC
("While
recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of peace
and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an internal armed conflict, the
United Nations has consistently maintained the position that amnesty cannot
be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law.").
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Second, any attempt to arrive a priori at a list will
inevitably reflect the interests of those who compile it-and
this risks, in practice, replication of the Western liberallegal paradigm. 90 The purpose of Drumbl's approach, I take
it, is precisely not to pre-determine an acceptable list
(though his "interpretive guidelines" 91 effectively establish
a kind of minimum), but rather to empower a conversation
that would generate different
approaches. His distrust of a
92
list is the right intuition.
Thus the core educative and reformative project that
Drumbl's cosmopolitan pluralism suggests may well be
directed at ourselves-we cosmopolitans-who will have to
learn not only to put up with, but embrace, a considerable
dose of pragmatism. And not the kind of grudging
pragmatism that human rights advocates have shown in
the past-for example, in a much earlier iteration of the
kind of project Drumbl contemplates, when Latin American
activists had to weigh the pursuit of legal justice and truth
against the real residual power of the military to destabilize

It would be interesting to consider what the response of today's robust ICL
and transitional justice community would have been to the post-Franco
transition in Spain, which was premised precisely on public amnesia and
effective amnesty concerning events of the Civil War and the dictatorship. Even
with the recent passage of a Law on Historical Memory, there is no question of
prosecution-yet despite not having followed the prescribed ICL course, Spain
is today a wonderful place.
90. Even Jose Zalaquett's maxim "the whole truth and as much justice as is
possible"--conventionally seen as an exercise in pragmatism-reveals an ideal,
ideological commitment to a particular project of transitional justice: truthtelling. Orentlicher, supra note 7, at 12. One suspects that a candid review of
indigenous reconciliation (and punishment) projects would reveal, at best, an
uneven record about the necessity of "truth," if by truth we mean an accurate
historical accounting of the events and causes of atrocity. Shared history is not
identical with true history-Renan speaks of a nation as a group of people
united by a mistaken view about the past. The risk, then, is that the
international-global--community will reassert itself: if we know there is
another history that is more true-and we are committed to the truth-then the
coalescence among the locally affected population of a collective recollection that
demonstrably deviates from the international view will not satisfy; and because
it does not satisfy, it will not serve its purpose-we will not allow it to.
91. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 189; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
92. Cf. Berman, supra note 44, at 1236 ('The messiness of hybridity also
means that it is impossible to provide answers ex ante regarding occasions when
pluralism should be honored and occasions when it should be trumped.").

2008]

THE UNMAPPED ECOLOGY OF ATROCITY

1365

that continent's new democracies. 93 In the debate about
ICL, it is the advocates of human rights who have power
and will have to be restrained: setting non-negotiable
standards will have to be a far rarer and more humble
activity; universal standards and non-negotiable minimums
will have to be very general, and very minimal.
Even if successful in re-educating elites who are
committed to a narrow liberal-legalist model, the entire
project of accommodation could collapse under the lightness
of its own relativism. But that may be a risk worth taking,
since the alternative-that a Galadrielite elite will, out of
the most humane impulses, refuse to negotiate anything,
defer to anything, understand anything-is by far the
greater and more real risk, arising as it does out of the
natural logic of power, which destroys perspective and
sympathy even as it intensifies the conviction of one's own
righteousness.
C. Taking Victim Communities Seriously
One of the virtues of APIL is that it is not exclusively
centered on the victim; Drumbl's discussion of the uniquely
collective nature of mass atrocity focuses equally on
perpetrators, since both are collective communities implicated
in discrimination-based mass atrocity. Still, Drumbl's
book-like transitional justice initiatives more generallytakes the perspectives of victims very seriously, and this is,
in its way, expressive of a humane and liberal
individualism. 94
93. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 7, at 127 ("In many countries in Latin
America, the price exacted for the end of military rule was society's acceptance
of the outgoing junta's self-amnesty; in others, impunity for past crimes was the
military's implicit but unambiguous price for remaining in the barracks as
fragile democracies took root. Yet for the newly elected successor governments
to honor nakedly self-serving claims of untouchability would betray the very
principles they had pledged to restore and safeguard."). Even in the moment of
pragmatic compromise, the human rights community articulated principles and
commitments that were in effect non-negotiable. This is a courageous
undertaking when one is in a position of weakness-like Havel's "speaking
truth to power"-but it is more complicated when one has become, like the
advocates of ICL today, the powerful one. Cf. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES
OF VIRTUE (2004).
94. Cf. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 1316 ("I offer, as a starting point, a
perspective that treats victims as individuals and aggressors in the collective
(instead of international criminal law's current focus on victims in the collective
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Yet a serious desire to empower local communities of
victims may sit uncomfortably with a democratic qualification
on ICL's deference, which is one of Drumbl's guidelinesseen, for example, in his rejection of Pashtunwali as
patriarchal and unrepresentative. I have no doubt that
almost all victims would prefer that their own concepts of
justice should govern-that the punishment should fit the
crime as they define each-and when one moves from the
level of the individual to that of the community, it is quite
common that communities (through their locally legitimate
leaders) reach conclusions about participation and
definition that may not accord with individual members'
views. Atrocity visits traditional and illiberal communities
as often as it does modern, inclusive ones, and insisting too
strongly on a narrowly defined democratic pedigree for
alternative
models-or
using tests
of democratic
participation as pretexts for rejecting substantive solutions
we disfavor 95-may
undercut the effort to grant those
communities some jurisgenerative role in devising a justicebased response to atrocity. 96
D. Customary Law Implications
Reflecting on the problem of including victim
communities reminds us that once we open the vertical and
horizontal planes to multiple models, we also open them to
contestation and competition. Perhaps there is no satisfactory,
stable equilibrium between the demands of a uniform
universalism and the cacophony of diverse decisional
and aggressors as individuals).").
95. Drumbl notes concerns among the Acholi communities of northern
Uganda that prosecution of the Lord's Resistance Army by the ICC may hinder
local efforts at reconciliation. Leaders in the Acholi communities have proposed
alternative, locally derived approaches that would, in effect, also create an
amnesty. ICL proponents have questioned how much the Acholi leaders' view
corresponds to those of individual members of the community-a democratic
concern. This very act of questioning, however, simply reveals the deep,
patterned preference for an atomized individualism, and, I think, a preference
for the judicial model, since we assume-on minimal evidence-that any
discrepancy between leader and people will be in favor of a model more like,
well, our own. Would we spend as much time worrying about the democratic
bona fides of the Acholi leaders if they were calling for ICC prosecution?
96. Perhaps the very fact that mass atrocity arises out of conformity-which
is always conformity to some locally defined standard-is a justification for
prioritizing local trials?
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autonomies. But there is also an unequal, if often
unacknowledged, distribution of power, 97 and in the face of
elite skepticism and opposition, local alternatives will often
collapse or conform. This much is clear from Drumbl's own
analysis, and the question is: what confidence can we have
that his alternative will prove any different?
As I have indicated, it was not the purpose of his book
to develop fully the grounds for that confidence, but it
seems immediately essential to consider how to develop a
means of supporting and legitimating local claims-a
means more robust than qualified deference (or any of the
present models). This need not extend as far as "the narrow
relativism of the belief that morality is entirely time and
space specific, or purely a matter of local culture," 98 but we
need some theory of decisional autonomy that has sufficient
skeletal strength to resist the viral, centripetal logic of the
universal.
One such model may present itself: the focus on victims,
local communities, and multiple voices suggests the
potential of linking Drumbl's project with recent efforts to
theorize the participation of individuals and communities in
the formation of customary international law. 99 Giving local
communities a claim to generate law would immensely
strengthen their hand against homogenizing and preemptive
97. Cf. Reydams, supra note 45, at manuscript 1 ("As jurists we have been
slow to recognize that international criminal justice is inseparable from (geopolitics).").
98. DAVID M. SMITH, GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 11 (1994).

99. See, e.g., Christiana Ochoa, The Individualand Customary International
Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 119 (2007); Jordan J. Paust, Customary
InternationalLaw: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States,
12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1990); see also Detlev F. Vagts, InternationalRelations
Looks at Customary International Law: A Traditionalist'sDefence, 15 EUR. J.

INT'L L. 1031, 1032 (2004) (speaking of "break[ing] open the black boxes of
nation-states and look[ing] at the interactions of flesh and blood individuals
involved"). Even these approaches are, in general, far more focused on
individuals interacting in ways consistent with classic liberal-cosmopolitan
concepts-that is, through voluntaristic associations or through their statesthan with traditionalist modes of social organization (including ethnic modes
such as the Acholi or the community adhering to Pashtunwali); Ochoa, for
example, identifies the following loci for individuals' participation in customary
international
law:
General
Assembly
resolutions,
non-governmental
organizations, data from human rights litigation, and public polling. Ochoa,
supra, 176-84. Presumably, a robust alternative to the current form of ICL
would need to cast its net wider.
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pressures from the international and state levels, and from
committed advocates of a liberal-legalist perspective.
Unlike qualified deference, which inevitably leaves
decisional authority with some repository of the international
community as a whole and the committed cosmopolitanuniversalist ICL community in particular, a claim based on
authority to generate legal norms (or at least participate
directly in their generation) involves communities as of
right, without reference to an a priori standard which they
must meet (in order, for example to be afforded deference).
Such a view would also be entirely consonant with Drumbl's
legal pluralist sensibilities, 100 without necessarily carrying
the reflexive liberalism which normally attaches to
pluralism but effectively precludes many traditional models
from serious consideration.
An individual or community-based customary law
perspective might provide a broader and more defensible
platform for the articulation of local models which depart
from universal commitments precisely because they are
local-indigenous-to the place most affected by atrocity1 01
and in turn, might provide a rationale for acquiescence by
committed liberal-legalists who would naturally regret the
illiberal choices other autonomous, law-generative
communities make, but would10also
find it marginally more
2
difficult, on principle, to object.
100. The linkages between legal pluralism (which Drumbl discusses in
APIL) and individualist or community-based customary international law
approaches-both of which posit multiple, overlapping, cooperating, and
competing actors generating law-seem evident. Cf. Berman, supra note 44, at
1175-76 ("[Plrocesses of international norm development inevitably lead
scholars to consider overlapping transnational jurisdictional assertions by
nation-states, as well as norms articulated by international bodies,
nongovernmental organizations . . . indigenous communities . . . networks of
activists, and so on.").
101. Cf. Michael Byers, Power, Obligation and Customary International
Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 81, 84 (2001) ("[There] are always some who
mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than others, either because of
their weight, which is to say their power in this world, or because their interests
bring them more frequently this way." (citing CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY
AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 149 (P.E. Corbett trans., 1957))).
102. Claims that empower individuals and communities to make customary
international law certainly do not represent the mainstream. See, e.g., Ochoa,
supra note 99, at 135 (noting that even critiques of the standard account of
customary international law [CIL] "ha[ve] accepted the core premise that only
states can form CIL. The idea that individuals ought to have a participatory
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CONCLUSION: NOT A MACHINE, BUT A MAP

I have no idea if these are the right implications to
draw-if these risks, opportunities, and incentives plausibly
arise from taking Drumbl's intuitions seriously and
building a frame onto them. The intuitions seem right; the
end goal, as far as it can be seen, seems worthy too.
Between intuition and summation, between encouragement
and arrival, whole books could be written. Drumbl's is one
such book, and one of the first, so I would like to say one
more thing about its direction, which concerns that other,
minor theme of ecology.
I think Drumbl wants a machine-complex, sensitive,
fine-tuned with inter-operating and coordinated parts, but a
machine nonetheless: "sanction might look different and
assume different calibrations in each case of atrocity."'103 A
tool is useful because it is fit to a task, but precisely because
it is designed to do one thing, it often does not do other
things well. And so we need more tools, and more, and of
course people must be trained to use them; inevitably, they
become comfortable with some tools, and we all know the
old saying about how a man with a hammer sees problems.
And the problem is that the problem he poses, and for
which he builds, is more like a landscape: interdependent,
dynamically interactive, changing across lines with few
definable edges. It is a matter of biomes and niches, more
than interoperability and specifications. Some things will
grow almost anywhere-they are suited to a variety of
conditions-but nothing on this earth grows in every
climate. The world is a single biosphere, and what one does
in one place affects every other, but that does not mean
orchids bloom easily in Alaska. And anytime you introduce
something new, no matter how useful, it comes at a cost.
I do not wish to push the metaphor beyond its
role in CIL formation is nearly completely absent ....
The literature on CIL
includes writings in which individuals figure as shadows and whispers in
relation to CIL"). But then Drumbl's project is, by its nature, a radically
reformative one, and it might do better seeking conceptual allies in claims that
resist the current doctrinal paradigm, rather than ones that assume it.
103. DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 19. Even when he picks up the ecological
theme, the machine is there: "[C]onsideration should be given to consolidating
diverse mechanisms more closely attuned to the social geographies of the
afflicted societies." Id. at 148.
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usefulness: people are not plants, and norms may prove
more transferable than trees. Nor do I wish to propose yet
another "law and.. ." to fill the legal academy's methodological
void.104 But there may be something to considering more
seriously the organic nature of this project-which, after
all, is really about culture-and consequently the need to
ground institutional arrangements in the specific facts of
local particularities and to give those particularities a
special respect and priority. Our response to atrocity ought
properly be ecological because atrocity itself is diverse:
atrocity is unique not only because it is collective or
international, but because each atrocity takes place in a
specific context-a history, a culture, and a place-that
marks it and makes it different from all others. Atrocity
may be a crime against humanity, but it is first, foremost,
most painfully, and most particularly a crime by, against,
and within a community somewhere on the face of this
earth.
Drumbl knows this; the whole project of APIL is an
engagement with the fact of this diversity. It is one of
APIL's real contributions that he demonstrates the
profound failure of the ICL project-convinced of its
rightness and its efficacy-to allow or even imagine the
flourishing of anything not in its own image. His response,
however, has been to sketch a formidable engineering
challenge. It may prove too difficult to build, though
perhaps-if we put down the tools of the machinist and take
up those of the naturalist-it can be encouraged to grow.
But first, the evil that is its object needs to be understood; it
needs to be mapped.
104. Ecological explanations are already common in domestic criminological
analysis, though principally in terms of explaining the origins of crime rather
than designing institutional responses. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME
(J.M. Byrne & R.J. Sampson eds., 1986). The field of law that has proven most
receptive to geographical approaches is, perhaps unsurprisingly, environmental
law. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal
Dialogue?, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181 (2007). Yet even within environmental law
itself, the production of diversity can meet resistance from universalism. See,
e.g., Nicolas de Sadeleer, EC Law and Biodiversity, in REFLECTIONS ON 30 YEARS
OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: A HIGH LEVEL OF PROTECTION? 349, 369 (Richard
Macrory ed., 2006) (warning that EU subsidiarity principles have "led to the
production of fuzzy and soft law to the detriment of precise and unconditional
rights" and that "[a]lthough subsidiarity has the merit of offering . .
indispensable room for manoeuvre to Member States, this principle could well
sound the death-knell for a truly common policy").

